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ABSTRACT
Imperatives occur ubiquitously in natural
languages. They produce forces which
change the addressee’s cognitive state and
regulate her actions accordingly. In real
life we often receive conflicting orders,
typically, issued by various authorities
with different ranks. A new update se-
mantics is proposed in this paper to for-
malize this idea. The general properties
of this semantics, as well as its background
ideas are discussed extensively. In addition,
we compare our framework with other ap-
proaches of deontic logics in the context of
normative conflicts.
Keywords: imperatives, update semantics,
priorities, forces, normative conflicts
1. Introduction
Imperatives occur ubiquitously in so-
cial communications. To act success-
fully in a society, we have to under-
stand their precise meaning, as impera-
tives often regulate actions. From the
1990s, several prominent new frame-
works have been proposed. Follow-
ing the slogan “you know the meaning
of a sentence if you know the change
it brings about in the cognitive state
of anyone who wants to incorporate
the information conveyed by it”, up-
date semantics (Veltman (1996)) was
proposed to deal with information up-
date. It provided a new and power-
ful view to interpret natural sentences.
So far, attempts have been made in
Veltman (2010), Mastop (2005) and Ju
(2010) to apply the framework to im-
peratives. On the basis of deontic log-
ics, Belnap et al. (2001) made a pro-
posal to study actions that are typically
expressed by STIT-sentences “see to it
that . . . ”, bringing actions with choices
made by agents together. Other recent
works in this line are Horty (2001),
Broersen et al. (2006) and Herzig and
Troquard (2006). Adopting dynamic
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epistemic logic (DEL) approach, Yamada (2006; 2008) introduced a new dynamic
action of “commanding” to deontic logic, and interpreted imperatives in the
framework of dynamic deontic logics.
In real life, we often receive conflicting orders issued by different authorities. Con-
sider the following example:
Example 1.1. A general d, a captain e and a colonel f utter the following sentences,
respectively, to a private.
(1) The general: Do A! Do B !
(2) The captain: Do B ! Do C !
(3) The colonel: Don’t do A! Don’t do C !
It is clear that these are imperatives containing conflicts, w.r.t actions A and C .
Intuitively, instead of getting stuck, the private will come up with the following
plan after a deliberation: She should do A, do B , but not do C . What made her
mind settled is the following fact: The authorities of d, e and f are ranked as
follows: e < f < d. This makes her decide on which orders to obey, and which
ones to disobey. However, the main focus of those previous works has been to
understand the meaning of one single imperative. Not much attention has been
paid to conflicting orders, which were simply taken to be absurd, thus resulting
in very trivial facts in the existing frameworks. In this paper, we will propose a
solution to such problems.
Our work is based on the following ideas. Imperatives have core propositional
content.1 Imperatives produce imperative forces, which tend to “push” the agent
to make their propositional content true. In practice, all sentences are uttered by
specific speakers. One same imperative may produce imperative forces differently
to an addressee, if it is uttered by different speakers. To realize these ideas, we
will borrow some thought from the logics of agency, especially the priority-based
preference models (de Jongh and Liu (2009), related ideas occur in the literature
on normative conflicts). On the other hand, we retain the tradition of update
semantics and we think that the meaning of an imperative lies in how it changes
an agent’s cognitive state, more specifically, imperative force state, which is the
state of imperative forces the agent bears.
The following sections are organized as follows. We will first introduce the basic
definitions and techniques of update semantics for imperatives in Section 2. In
Section 3, we present our new proposal and study its general properties. In Sec-
tion 4, we show that introducing ranks of authorities into the update semantics
1We are well aware of the development (cf. von Wright (1963), Segerberg (1982), and Belnap et al.
(2001)) which takes imperatives to be agency-involved actions. We think that is a promising ap-
proach, however, in this paper we will discuss imperatives in the tradition of update semantics.
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for imperatives can solve the difficulties we had in Example 1.1. Besides, we also
discuss some further issues concerning the semantics. In Section 5 we compare
our framework with what was proposed in Hansen (2006) in the context of nor-
mative conflicts. Finally, we end our paper with some conclusions and possible
directions for future work in Section 6.
2. Force Structures and Track Structures
An update system is a triple 〈L ,Σ,[·]〉, whereL is a language, Σ a set of informa-
tion states, and [·] a function from L to Σ→ Σ, which assigns each sentence φ
an operation [φ]. For any φ, [φ] is called an update function, which is intended
to interpret the meaning of φ. The meaning of a sentence lies in how it updates
information states—the core idea of update semantics.
In his recent work (Veltman (2010)), Veltman has presented a new semantics for
imperatives based on the update semantics, and argued that the meaning of im-
peratives is an update function on plans. Inspired by Veltman (2010), Ju (2010)
interpreted the meaning of imperatives as an update function on force structures.
In this section, we introduce an equivalent version of the semantics given in Ju
(2010) in a different way, and then extend it in the next section and make it work
for our problems.
Definition 2.1 (languages). Let Φ be a set of propositional variables, and p ∈ Φ.
The standard language of propositional logic Y is defined as follows:2
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ∧φ | φ∨φ
The languageL of imperatives is defined as the set {!φ | φ ∈Y }.
Each finite set T of literals ofY is called a track. A track T is consistent if and only
if it does not contain both p and ¬p for any p. Information states are identified
with track structures, as defined below.
Definition 2.2 (track structures). A finite set L of tracks is a track structure iff
(1) Each T ∈ L is consistent; (2) Any T ,T ′ ∈ L contain the same variables.
2We do not consider the connective → as a primitive symbol. The reason is that we will use the
language Y to express propositional content of imperatives. In natural languages, imperatives do
not take implications as propositional content.
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Example 2.1. The following picture represents a track structure.
¬p4,¬p2, p3, p1
p4, p2, p3,¬p1
p4, p2, p3, p1
p4,¬p2, p3, p1
The reading of track structures is this: For any track structure L, the agent has
to choose a track of L and make all literals in it true, but she may freely choose
which one. If the agent makes all literals of some track of L true, we say that L
is performed. There are two special track structures: {;} and ;. The former can
always be trivially performed, which is called the minimal track structure. The
latter can never be performed, which is called the absurd track structure.
In what follows we define a procedure which recursively outputs a track structure
for any given imperative !φ. To do that, we first introduce the notion of force
structures.
Definition 2.3 (force structures). Each finite set K of finite sets of literals of Y is
called a force structure.
Example 2.2. The force structure K1 = {{p4,¬p2}, {p3}, {p2, p1}} can be illus-






Definition 2.4 (tracks of force structures). Let K = {X1, . . . ,Xn} be any force
structure. For any Xi , let X
′
i be the smallest set such that both p and ¬p are in
X ′i for any p occurring in Xi . T = X
′′
1 ∪ · · · ∪X ′′n is a track for K iff (1) X ′′i ⊆ X ′i
and X ′′i ∩Xi 6= ;; (2) For any p occurring in Xi , one and only one of p and ¬p is
in X ′′i .
Example 2.3. The picture in Example 2.1 represents the set of all consistent tracks
of the force structure in Example 2.2.
Let K be any force structure, we define functions T + and T − as follows:
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Definition 2.5 (T + and T −).
(a) T +(K , p) =
({{p}} if K = ;,
{X ∪{p} |X ∈K} otherwise.
T −(K , p) =
({{¬p}} if K = ;,
{X ∪{¬p} |X ∈K} otherwise.
(b) T +(K ,¬φ) = T −(K ,φ)
T −(K ,¬φ) = T +(K ,φ)
(c) T +(K ,φ∧ψ) = T +(K ,φ)∪T +(K ,ψ)
T −(K ,φ∧ψ) = T −(T −(K ,φ),ψ)
(d) T +(K ,φ∨ψ) = T +(T +(K ,φ),ψ)
T −(K ,φ∨ψ) = T −(K ,φ)∪T −(K ,ψ)
For any imperative !φ, T +(;,φ) is called the force structure of it. Clearly, imper-
atives correspond to force structures in a recursive way.
Example 2.4. {{p1, p3},{p1, p4},{p2, p3},{p2, p4}} is the force structure of the im-
perative !((p1 ∧ p2)∨ (p3 ∧ p4)).
Let U (φ) be the set of all consistent track of T +(;,φ).3 U (φ) is the track struc-
ture of !φ.
Definition 2.6 (compatibility of track structures). Track structures L1 and L2 are
compatible iff (1) For any track T1 ∈ L1, there is a track T2 ∈ L2 such that T1 ∪T2
is consistent; (2) For any track T2 ∈ L2, there is a track T1 ∈ L1 such that T1 ∪T2
is consistent.
Compatibility is used to characterize conflicts among imperatives.
Example 2.5. Two speakers respectively utter these two imperatives to an agent:
(a) Close the door or the window!
(b) Close the window!
Intuitively, there is some conflict between these two commands, although they
are consistent from the propositional logic point of view. The following two
3Readers may realize that T +(;,φ) corresponds to a conjunctive normal form (CNF) ofφ in propo-
sitional logic. That is true. However, please note that the new notions (e.g. compatibility, validity)
to be defined on the basis of track structures have very different meaning in this context.
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It is easy to verify that the two track structures are not compatible.
Definition 2.7 (merge of track structures). 4 L1 unionsq L2 = {T1 ∪ T2|T1 ∈ L1,T2 ∈
L2, and T1 ∪T2 is consistent}
Example 2.6. The merge of the track structures {{D ,¬W },{¬D ,W }} and
{{D ,¬V },{¬D ,W }} is {{D ,¬W ,¬V },{¬D ,W ,V }}.
¬D , W
D ,¬W
unionsq ¬D , V
D ,¬V
= ¬D , W , V
D ,¬W ,¬V
The semantics for imperatives is defined as follows:
Definition 2.8 (update of track structures with imperatives). 5
Ld!φe=

LunionsqU (φ) if L and U (φ) are compatible
; otherwise
Basically, updating a track structure L with an imperative !φ is the merge of L
and the track structure of !φ. The exceptional cases are those that L and the track
structure of !φ are not compatible. When this case takes place, the result of the
update is the absurd track structure ;. 6
At this point, we would like to return to Example 1.1. We take the minimal force
structure {;} as the beginning point. After the general’s and captain’s commands,
the track structure of the private becomes {{A,B ,C }}. This means that the agent
has to make A,B and C true. The track structure of the imperative “don’t do
A” is {{¬A}}, which is not compatible with {{A,B ,C }}. Therefore, after the
colonel’s first command, the track structure of the private becomes ;. Intuitively,
4This terminology is from Veltman (2010).
5Veltman (2010) defines meaning of imperatives as an update function on plans. Intuitively, a plan
is a set of free choices, and a track structure is also a set of free choices. In this sense, the update
defined here is similar to Veltman (2010). Their main difference lies in what are viewed as free
choices.
6The notion of validity by the invariance of track structures can solve Ross’s paradox.
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this means that the agent gets stuck, and she will be stuck forever. We see that the
semantics given in Definition 2.8 does not work for Example 1.1. Similarly, re-
garding this example, no satisfying solution has been provided in Veltman (2010)
either. This is the starting point of the current work. In our view, to handle such
difficulties, we should take the ranks of the speakers into account. Our attempt
will follow in the next section.
3. Update with Priorities
3.1. Introducing Authorities
A new update system is a tuple 〈L ,Σ,[·],A,≤〉, where A is a finite set of speakers,
and ≤ is a preorder on A. For any a, b ∈ A, a ≤ b means that b has a rank at
least high as what a has. Now we formulate the semantics based on the new
update system, incorporating the authorities in the framework presented in the
preceding.
Definition 3.1 (agent-oriented language). The language L of imperatives is de-
fined as the set {!aφ|φ ∈ Y ,a ∈ A}, where Y is the language given in Definition
2.1.
One can see that all imperatives are relative to specific speakers now.
Let L be the set of literals of Y . Let L′ = {la |l ∈ L,a ∈ A}. Each finite set T of L′
is called a track. We define three properties of tracks below.
Definition 3.2 (resolvability of tracks). A track T is resolvable iff for any pa and
pb , if both pa and ¬pb are in T , then either a < b or b < a.
Example 3.1. Suppose a < b , then the track T1 = {pa , qc , rd ,¬pb } is resolvable.
In case a ≤ b and b ≤ a, T1 is not resolvable. In case a 6≤ b and b 6≤ a, T1 is not
resolvable.
If a < b , the conflict of T1 can be resolved by obeying commands from b while
disobeying commands from a. However, if a ≤ b ∧ b ≤ a or a and b are not
comparable, T1 is not resolvable, for the agent does not know whether she should
make p true or not.
Definition 3.3 (succinctness of tracks). A track T is succinct iff there are no pa
and pb such that (1) a < b ; (2) Either both pa and pb are in T or both ¬pa and¬pb are in T .
Example 3.2. If a < b , the track T1 = {pa , qc , rd , pb } is not succinct. In case
a ≤ b ∧ b ≤ a, T1 is succinct. In case a 6≤ b ∧ b 6≤ a, T1 is succinct.
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Definition 3.4 (consistency of tracks). A track T is consistent iff (1) T is succinct;
(2) There are no pa and pb such that both pa and ¬pb are in T .
The property of consistency is not just stronger than succinctness, but also
stronger than resolvability: For any track T , if T is consistent, then it is re-
solvable, but this might not be the case the other way around.
Example 3.3. Suppose a < b . The track T1 = {pa , qc , rd ,¬pb } is resolvable and
succinct, but not consistent.
Compared with the ordinary notion of consistency in logic, the notion of con-
sistency defined here seems somewhat heavy, as it contains the notion of suc-
cinctness. We do this for technical reasons, which will be explained in Section 4.
Intuitively, consistent tracks are “good” ones, while inconsistent tracks are not.
Definition 3.5 (track structures with authorities). A finite set L of tracks is a
track structure iff (1) Each T ∈ L is resolvable; (2) For any T ,T ′ ∈ L, T and T ′
contain the same variables.
Definition 2.2 defines track structures without authorities, where each track of a
track structure is required to be consistent. This requirement gets relaxed for track
structures with authorities, namely, each track of a track structure is resolvable.
Finally, if all tracks of a track structure are consistent, we call it a consistent one.
Example 3.4. Suppose a < d . The following picture represents a track structure
with authorities, where each literal is relative to some speaker.
¬pa ,¬qb , rc , pd
pa , qb , rc ,¬pd
pa , qb , rc , pd
pa ,¬qb , rc , pd
If a ≤ d∧d ≤ a or a and d are not comparable, this picture is not a track structure.
In the previous section, we describe a procedure by which an imperative !φ cor-
responds to a track structure, where authorities are not considered. Similarly, we
can build up a correspondence between an imperative !aφ and a track structures
with authorities. Here we don’t go through the details. We simply use U (!aφ) to
denote the track structure of !aφ.
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3.2. Update Function and Some Properties
First, again, some technical notions. For any two tracks T and T ′, we call T a
sub-track of T ′ if T ⊆ T ′. If T is consistent, it is a consistent sub-track.
Definition 3.6 (maximally consistent sub-tracks). A track T ′ is a maximally con-
sistent sub-track of a track T iff T ′ is a consistent sub-track of T and for any
sub-track T ′′ of T , if T ′ ⊂ T ′′, then T ′′ is not consistent.
Example 3.5. Suppose b < a. The track {pa , qc , rd } is a maximally consistent sub-
track of the track {pa , pb , qc , rd ,¬pe}. Note that the track {pa , pb , qc , rd } is not
a maximally consistent sub-track of {pa , pb , qc , rd ,¬pe}, as {pa , pb , qc , rd } is not
succinct.
Proposition 3.1. For any track T , all of its maximally consistent sub-tracks contain
the same variables as what T has.
Proof. Let T be any track. Let T1 be any maximally consistent sub-track of T .
Suppose that T and T1 do not contain the same variables. Since T1 ⊆ T , there is
a variable, say p, such that T contains p but T1 does not. Then there is a literal
li containing p such that li ∈ T but li /∈ T1. Since T1 does not contain p, then
T1∪{li} ⊃ T1 is consistent and a sub-track of T . Therefore, T1 is not a maximally
consistent sub-track of T , which is strange. Hence, T1 and T contain the same
variables. uunionsq
Definition 3.7 (preorder  on maximally consistent sub-tracks). Let T be any
track. Let T ′ and T ′′ be any maximally consistent sub-tracks of T . T ′  T ′′ iff
for any l ′a ∈ T ′, there is a l ′′b ∈ T ′′ such that l ′′b contains the same variable as what
l ′a has, moreover, a ≤ b .
It is easy to see that  is reflexive and transitive, so it’s a preorder.  may not be
antisymmetric. Here is a simple counter-example. Let T = {pa ,¬pa}, T ′ = {pa}
and T ′′ = {¬pa}. Both T ′ and T ′′ are maximally consistent sub-tracks of T .
T ′  T ′′ and T ′′  T ′, but T ′ 6= T ′′. Hence,  might not be a partial order.
Definition 3.8 (strict partial order ≺ on maximally consistent sub-tracks). Let
T be any track. Let T ′ and T ′′ be any maximally consistent sub-tracks of T .
T ′ ≺ T ′′ iff T ′  T ′′ but T ′′ 6 T ′.
Lemma 3.1. Let T be any resolvable track with only one variable. Let X be the set
of its maximally consistent sub-tracks. X has a greatest element under the relation≺7.
7Note that ≺ is a strict partial order. a is a greatest element of X under the relation ≺ if and only
if for any x ∈ X , if x 6= a, then x ≺ a. Here we use the notion “greatest element” in a slightly
different sense from set theory where it is usually defined relative to a partial order. We thank
Berislav Žarnic´ for pointing this out.
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Proof. We consider two cases. First, we suppose that T is consistent. Then
X is a singleton. Clearly, X has a greatest element. Next, we suppose that T
is not consistent. Again, there are two possible cases: (1) There are no pa and¬pb such that both of them are in T ; (2) there are such pa and ¬pb . In the
first case, T = {pa1 , . . . , pam} or T = {¬pb1 , . . . , pbm}.8 we can verify that X is a
singleton, no matter whether T = {pa1 , . . . , pam} or {¬pb1 , . . . , pbm}. Therefore,
X has a greatest element. We consider the second case. Let T = {pa1 , . . . , pam ,¬pb1 , . . . , ¬pbn }, where 1 ≤ m,n. T has two maximally consistent sub-tracks:
T1 = {pam1 , . . . , pamk }, T2 = {¬pbn1 , . . . ,¬pbnl }, where k ≤ m and l ≤ n. Hence,
X = {T1,T2}. Suppose that X does not have a greatest element under ≺, then
T1 6≺ T2 and T2 6≺ T1. We can get that for any b j , there is an ai such that ai 6< b j ,
because otherwise T1 ≺ T2. Since T is resolvable, we have that for any b j , there
is an ai such that b j < ai . Similarly, for any ai , there is a b j such that ai < b j .
Now we can obtain an infinite decreasing chain, say bh < ai < b j < . . . . This is
impossible. Therefore, X has a greatest element. uunionsq
Proposition 3.2. Let T be any resolvable track. Let X be the set of its maximally
consistent sub-tracks. X has a greatest element under the relation ≺.
Proof. Suppose that T contains n different variables. Let T = T1 ∪ · · · ∪Tn such
that for any Ti , all literals in it contain the same variables. In fact, T
′ ∈ X if and
only if T ′ = T ′1 ∪ · · · ∪ T ′n , where each T ′i is a maximally consistent sub-track of
Ti . By Lemma 3.1, each Ti has a greatest maximally consistent sub-track under≺.
Let T ′′ = T ′′1 ∪ · · · ∪T
′′
n , where T
′′
i is the greatest maximally consistent sub-track
of Ti . We see that T
′′ ∈ X . It can be easily verified that T ′′ is a greatest element
of X under the relation ≺. uunionsq
Example 3.6. Suppose a < d . The track {¬pd , qb , rc} is a greatest maximally
consistent sub-track of {pa , qb , rc ,¬pd } under the relation ≺.
The conflict in the track {pa , qb , rc ,¬pd } can be resolved according to the given
authority rank a < d and the conflict-free result is {¬pd , qb , rc}.
Definition 3.9 (sub-structures). Let L be any track structure. A track structure
L′ is a sub-structure of L iff (1) For any T ′ ∈ L′, there is a T ∈ L such that T ′ ⊆ T ;
(2) For any T ∈ L, there is a T ′ ∈ L′ such that T ′ ⊆ T .
If L′ is consistent, we say that L′ is a consistent sub-structure of L.
8Note that {pa1 , . . . , pam } and {¬pb1 , . . . ,¬pbn } might not be consistent, because they might not be
succinct.
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Example 3.7. Suppose c < e .9 L′ is one of sub-structures of L10.
¬pa ,¬qb , rc , ¬sd , ¬re
pa ,¬qb , rc , ¬sd , ¬re
¬pa , qb , rc , sd , ¬re







Definition 3.10 (sufficient consistent sub-structures). Let L= {T1, . . . ,Tn} be any
track structure. A track structure L′ is a sufficient consistent sub-structure of L
iff L′ = {T ′1 , . . . ,T ′n}, where each T ′i is the greatest maximally consistent sub-track
of Ti under the relation ≺.
By Proposition 3.1, it can be verified that for any structure L = {T1, . . . ,Tn}, the
set {T ′1 , . . . ,T ′n}, where each T ′i is the greatest maximally consistent sub-track of
Ti , is always a consistent sub-structure of L. Therefore, any track structure has
a sufficient consistent sub-structure. Furthermore, any track structure has only
one sufficient consistent sub-structure.
Example 3.8. Suppose c < e . L′ is the sufficient consistent sub-structure of L.
¬pa ,¬qb , rc , ¬sd , ¬re
pa ,¬qb , rc , ¬sd , ¬re
¬pa , qb , rc , sd , ¬re
pa , qb , rc , ¬sd , ¬re
L
¬pa ,¬qb , ¬sd , ¬re
pa ,¬qb , ¬sd , ¬re
¬pa , qb , sd , ¬re
pa , qb , ¬sd , ¬re
L′
Track structure L is not consistent. The sufficient consistent sub-structure of L
is the result of making L consistent while respecting the authorities in L to the
greatest extent.
Definition 3.11 (merge of track structures). L1 unionsq L2 = {T1 ∪ T2|T1 ∈ L1,T2 ∈
L2,T1 ∪T2 is resolvable}.
9By Definition 3.5, any track of a track structure is resolvable. In this example, if we do not suppose
that c < e or e < c , L might not be a track structure.
10The dash lines in this picture are intended to help us understand the notion of sub-structure.
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Definition 3.12 (compatibility of track structures). Track structures L1 and L2
are compatible iff (1) For any T1 ∈ L1, there is a T2 ∈ L2 such that T1 ∪ T2 is
resolvable; (2) For any T2 ∈ L2, there is a T1 ∈ L1 such that T1 ∪T2 is resolvable.
We can verify that L1 and L2 are compatible if and only if both L1 and L2 are
sub-structures of L1 unionsq L2.
For any track structure L, we use V (L) to denote the sufficient consistent sub-
structure of L. The semantics for imperatives which takes authorities into account
is defined as follows.
Definition 3.13 (update of track structures with authorities).
Ld!aφe=

V (LunionsqU (!aφ)) if L and U (!aφ) are compatible; otherwise
Meaning of imperatives is an update function on track structures. Let L be any
track structure and !aφ be any imperative. If L and the track structure L
′ corre-
sponding to !aφ are compatible, the result of updating L with !aφ is the sufficient
consistent sub-structure of the merge of L and L′, otherwise the result is ;, which
is an absurd track structure.
Based on the semantics, the notion of validity for imperative inferences can be
defined as what follows.
Definition 3.14 (validity of imperative inferences). !a1φ1, . . . , !anφn |=!bψ if and
only if the track structure 0d!bψe is a sub-structure of 0d!a1φ1e . . .d!anφne, where
0= {;}.
It can be proved that if !a1φ1, . . . , !anφn |=!bψ, then 0d!a1φ1e . . .d!anφned!bψe =
0d!a1φ1e . . .d!anφne. We will come back to this notion in Section 5.
4. Illustration and Discussion
4.1. Illustration
We illustrate some properties of the semantics defined above. First, let us look at
Example 1.1 again. Recall that a general d, a captain e and a colonel f utter the
following sentences, respectively, to a private.
(1) The general: Do A! Do B!
(2) The captain: Do B! Do C!
(3) The colonel: Don’t do A! Don’t do C!
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Suppose that the starting track structure of the private is L0 = {;}, which means
that the private does not bear any imperative force. According to our new seman-









→!eC Ad ,Bd ,Ce
L4
→! f ¬A Ad ,Bd ,Ce
L5
→! f ¬C Ad ,Bd ,¬C f
L6
Ad ,Bd ,Ce ,¬Af
L′5






After the imperative !dA, the track structure L0 changes to L1, and after !dB , L1
changes to L2, and so on. L6 is the final track structure, according to which the
private should do A, B, but should not do C. This is what we expect. The track
structures L′5 and L
′
6 in the dash rectangles are auxiliary for us to understand the
update process, and they are not results of any update of this process. When ! f ¬A




5 is not consistent, it changes to L5 after a
deliberation of the private. Actually, L5 is equal to L4. L5 is the sufficient consis-
tent sub-structure of L′5 and respects the authority of the general. The similar case
also happens to L′6. This example shows how our semantics works in practice.
Next, let us consider an example from Veltman (2010) which involves free choices.
Example 4.1. John is ill and goes to see doctors c and d respectively.
(1) The doctor c: Drink milk or apple juice!
(2) The doctor d: Don’t drink milk!
Suppose that the original track structure of John is L0 = {;}. First, we suppose
that John trusts d more than c. The update process of John’s track structures is
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L2 is the final result of this update process. According to L2, John should not
drink milk, and he may and may not drink apple juice. As d has a higher author-
ity, this result is perfectly fine.
Now we suppose that c has a higher authority than d has. With this constraint,














L2 is the final result of this update process. The imperative uttered by d does not
essentially make much sense to John, because L1 = L2. According to L2, John
should drink milk or apple juice, and he may only drink milk, only drink apple
juice and drink both. We see that drinking milk is allowed. This result seems
not plausible. It seems practically reasonable to think that John should drink
apple juice but not drink milk, as if he does so, both of the imperatives could be
performed. In other words, only drinking apple juice seems to be safer than only
drinking milk or drinking both. However, we think that even not to drink milk
is more practically reasonable than to drink milk, John is still allowed to drink
milk in this case. We show this point by an example.
Example 4.2. A general and a captain utter the following to a private respectively.
(1) The general: You may have a rest.
(2) The captain: Move!
These two sentences are conflicting. Suppose that the private chooses to have a
rest, then normally, she will not be punished. This implies that the private is
allowed to stop, even to move is safer for him. Hence, we think that the result
mentioned above is plausible. Actually, the following claim seems reasonable: An
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agent a has a higher authority than what b has in giving commands if and only if
a has a higher authority than what b has in giving permissions.
The semantics given in Definition 2.8 is a special case of the semantics given in
Definition 3.13: When restricted to singleton of agents, the latter collapses to the
former. In other words, the former can be taken to be an update mechanism
for one agent case, but with agent omitted in notation. Note that the semantics
defined in Definition 2.8 does not satisfy the property of commutativity.11 There-
fore, the semantics given in Definition 3.13 does not have that property either.
Previously, we have taken tracks which are succinct and do not contain any con-
flict as “good” tracks. The reason why we require succinctness is out of the fol-
lowing consideration: Without succinctness, some thing “bad” could happen, in
which commutativity plays a role. Here is an example.
Example 4.3. Consider some agent a, her grandmother has a higher authority
than his parents, and his father and mother have the same authority. Here are
two sequences.
(1) Grandmother: Stop! Father: Don’t stop! Mother: Stop!
(2) Grandmother: Stop! Mother: Stop! Father: Don’t stop!
If we keep all other things unchanged and just drop the succinctness requirement,
the second sequence makes the agent get stuck, while the first one does not. This
is weird.
4.2. Discussion
In this subsection, we are going to address several further issues that are related to
our new framework.
As mentioned in the section of introduction, we think that imperatives produce
imperative forces, and uttering an imperative may change the addressee’s state of
imperative forces. In the semantics proposed above, we do not distinguish forces
and states of forces conceptually. They are considered to be the same, and they
are both represented as track structures.
About imperative force, there is one more thing we want to emphasize here.
Whether an agent is bearing some imperative force is not objective, but is de-
termined by the agent’s mind. The word “imperative force” might be misleading,
as it reminds us of physical forces. Instead of saying that an agent is bearing some
imperative force, perhaps we better say that, the agent thinks that she is bearing
some imperative force. Consider the following example.
11See Ju (2010) for examples.
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Example 4.4. A general and a captain utter the following imperatives to a private.
(1) The general: Move!
(2) The captain: Stop!
After a deliberation, the private thinks that the imperative of the captain is not in
force.
Concerning the authority order, here are some comments. First of all, an au-
thority order is relative to some specific agents. Two speakers might be ranked
differently from one agent to another. For example, two doctors might be in dif-
ferent authority relations for different patients. Also, an authority order is not
fixed universally. It often depends on specific contexts. Speaker a might have a
higher authority than speaker b for agent c in one context, but b might have a
higher authority than a in another context. For instance, suppose that a is c’s
father, and b is c’s mother. Suppose that a is a general, b is a colonel and c is a
private in the same army. In the army, a has a higher authority than b for c, but b
might have a higher authority than a in their family.
A core idea behind Veltman (2010) is that the borderline between semantics and
pragmatics for imperatives is not always clear, which is different from indictives.
We agree with this. Imperatives are usually used by speakers to generate obliga-
tions directly, while indicatives are used to report on something, including on
obligations. We think that the scope of semantics for imperatives is broader than
that for indicatives. We will explain this more in the following.
Firstly, we think that, for an addressee, one imperative may mean different things
if it is uttered by different speakers. This means speakers also contribute to the
meaning of imperatives. It can be better understood from the perspective of dy-
namic semantics. According to the meaning theory of dynamic semantics, the
meaning of an indicative lies in how it changes an agent’s information state. Fol-
lowing the same philosophy, the meaning of an imperative lies in how it changes
an agent’s imperative force state. Naturally, one same imperative may cause differ-
ent changes to an agent’s imperative force state, if it is uttered by different speakers
with different authorities. Therefore, we think speakers should be put into the
semantics of imperatives, not in pragmatics. One step further, in fact, speakers
also contribute to the meaning of indicatives, one same indicative may change
an agent’s information state very differently, if it is uttered by different speakers.
Consider the situation in which something uttered conflicts with the addressee’s
previous knowledge. It is an important issue for the addressee to decide whether
and how to take the new information, too.
Next, we show the difference by comparing imperatives “close the door” with
their corresponding obligation sentences “it is obligatory that you close the
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door”.12 As we said before, imperatives are used by speakers to generate obli-
gations directly, while as indicatives, descriptive obligation sentences are mainly
used to inform an agent that she is in some obligations, although in some cases
they can also be used to generate obligations. This implies that speakers of imper-
atives are always the sources of the relevant obligations13, but speakers of descrip-
tive obligation sentences might not be. This results in the difference in meaning
between imperatives and the corresponding obligation sentences. Consider the
following example:
Example 4.5.
(1) Close the door or the window!
(2) It is obligatory that you close the door or the window.
Suppose that speaker A utters the second sentence to the agent. A might not
be the source of the obligation. Such a case is possible: Someone else made the
obligation, but the agent has not known it yet; A heard about it, but did not get
it precisely; All A knows is that the agent should close the door or the window;
A tells the agent about it by the second sentence. Therefore, we can not say that
the second sentence implies the permission, say, the agent may close the window
but keep the door open. Now suppose that speaker B utters the first sentence to
the agent. B is the source of the obligation that the agent should close the door
or the window. Therefore, B knows exactly what she wants to order the agent
to do. If B just wants the agent, say, to close the door, she should not utter the
imperative “close the door or the window”. Therefore, by this imperative, what
B wants the agent to do is to close the door or the window, but she does not care
which. Therefore, the first sentence implies that the addressee is allowed not to
close the door, and is also allowed not to close the window, although it is not
allowed for him not to close any of them. This reminds us of Grice’s maxim of
quantity given in Grice (1975). Actually, this fits well with our way of thinking:
For imperatives, we should put more into semantics.
This discussion paves the way for the next section.
5. Comparison with Normative Conflicts
Normative conflicts refers to situations in which an agent ought to make some
propositions true, but it is impossible for him to do so. The impossibility may
be logical or practical. Suppose that an agent ought to join the army, and at the
same time ought not to join the army. In this case, it is logically impossible for
12A deep philosophical discussion about this connection was made in Žarnic´ (2003).
13Here we do not consider the sentences like “yesterday you father said to you: close the door, but
you didn’t hear it.
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the agent to do both. Suppose that an agent ought to meet a friend at 12:00 and
ought to take a train at 12:30, and suppose that if she meets his friend at 12:00,
she will miss the train. In this case, it is practically impossible for the agent to do
both. Logical impossibility does not involve any fact of the world, while practical
impossibility does involve some.
Generally speaking, situations in which an agent bears conflicting imperative
forces belong to normative conflicts, as imperatives generate obligations. Pre-
viously, we have introduced priorities on speakers in update semantics for im-
peratives, to model how an agent manages to solve normative conflicts. In the
literature, Horty (2003) and Hansen (2006) dealt with moral conflicts in deontic
logics by use of priorities on norms. Moral conflicts are special normative con-
flicts, and they only involve obligations for moral reasons. The ideas of Horty
(2003) and Hansen (2006) are somehow similar. They both introduced priorities
on norms and adopted the “disjunctive solution” for moral conflicts, which will
be explained later. As what Hansen (2006) argued, the theory proposed in Horty
(2003) was not adequate in some aspects. By using a technical method which was
used in Brewka (1989; 1991) and Nebel (1991; 1992), the theory given in Hansen
(2006) can avoid those problems. In this section, we compare our work with the
theory of Hansen (2006).
Descriptive obligation sentences are what deontic logics use in language. In Sec-
tion 4.2 we have presented some ideas on the connections between imperatives
and descriptive obligation sentences. For each φ ∈ Y , let Oφ be a descriptive
obligation sentence and Pφ be a permission sentence. Here is a claim concerning
the connection between !φ and Oφ.
Claim 5.1 (translation of imperatives to norms). Let the set {{l 11 , . . . , l n1 }, . . . , {l 1m ,
. . . , l nm}} be the track structure of !φ. !φ has the same meaning with Oφ∧P (l 11 ∧· · ·∧
l n1 )∧ · · · ∧ P (l 1m ∧ · · · ∧ l nm).
For any imperative, any track of its track structure is a way to perform the im-
perative. This claim says, uttering an imperative !φ is equivalent to say that it is
obligatory to make φ true and it is permitted to make φ true in any possible way.
We give an example:
Example 5.1.
(1) Close the door or the window!
(2) It is obligatory that you close the door or the window, it is permitted that
you close the door but do not close the window, it is permitted that you
close the window but do not close the door and it is permitted that you
close both.
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According to Claim 5.1, these two sentences have the same meaning. However,
the imperative “close the door or the window” and the descriptive obligation
sentence “it is obligatory that you close the door or the window” have different
meaning, because none of the permission sentences in this example is implied by
the descriptive obligation sentence. Take another example:
Example 5.2.
(1) Close the door and the window!
(2) It is obligatory that you close the door and the window and it is permitted
that you close the door and close the window.
Again, according to our claim, these two sentences have the same meaning. In
fact, the imperative “close the door and the window” has the same meaning with
the descriptive obligation sentence “It is obligatory that you close the door and
the window”, as the latter implies the permission sentence. Generally, for any φ,
if there are more than one way to make φ true, then !φ has a different meaning
from Oφ, otherwise they have the same meaning.
Based on the bridge between imperatives and descriptive obligation sentences, we
make it clear that in what sense our model can be compared with the proposal of
Hansen (2006). In Section 3, we introduced a set of speakers and a preorder on
that set and make imperatives relative to specific speakers. Then we defined the
entailment relation |= between a sequence !a1φ1, . . . , !anφn , which may be incon-
sistent, and an imperative !bψ. We did not consider any fact of the world there, so
the inconsistency is logical. Hansen (2006) introduced a strict partial order < on
obligations and defined the entailment relation ` between a set {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn}
of obligations, which may be logically inconsistent or inconsistent according to
some facts of the world, and an obligation Oψ. We use <A to denote an authority
order on speakers. In what follows, we only compare !a1φ1, . . . , !anφn |=!bψ with{Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn} `Oψ when the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) No facts of the world is involved;
(2) For any i , j ≤ n, ai <A a j if and only if Oφi <Oφ j ;
(3) For any k ≤ n, there is at most one way to make true φk .
There are two reasons to keep the third condition. When this condition is satis-
fied, then firstly, !akφk has the same meaning as Oφk , and secondly, a sequence of
imperatives have the same meaning with that of the corresponding set of impera-
tives, as the semantics for imperatives satisfies the principle of commutativity in
this case.
Let Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn and Oψ be any obligations. Let < be a strict partial order on
the set {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn}. Intuitively, Oφi < Oφ j means that Oφ j has a higher
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priority than Oφi does.
14 We restate the definition of {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn} ` Oψ
in Hansen (2006). Here is a result, the proof of which can be found in Hansen
(2006):
Theorem 5.1. For any relational structure 〈A,<〉 where< is a strict partial order on
the set A, there is 〈A,≺〉 such that (1)≺ is a strict partial order on A; (2)≺ is total, that
is, for any a, b ∈ A, if a 6= b , then a < b or b < a; (3) ≺ preserves <, that is, for any
a, b ∈A, if a < b , then a ≺ b .
Any ≺ satisfying the above condition is called a total extension of <. We
look at 〈{Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn},<〉. Since {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn} is finite, there are finite
total extensions of <. Let ≺1, . . . ,≺m be all total extensions of <. Let f be
a function such that for any {Oφn1 , . . . ,Oφnk } ⊆ {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn} (ni ≤ n),
f ({Oφn1 , . . . ,Oφnk }) = {φn1 , . . . ,φnk }. Let `PL be the entailment relation of
classical propositional logic. Now we fix a total extension ≺i of <, that is, a chain
Oφnn ≺i . . . ≺i Oφn1 . S ij ⊆ {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn}(0≤ j ≤ n) is defined recursively as
follows
Definition 5.1.
(1) S i0 = ;
(2) S ij+1 =
(
S ij ∪{Oφn j+1} if f (S ij )∪ f ({Oφn j+1}) 6`PL ⊥
S ij otherwise
This definition describes a procedure, by which we can get S in . Firstly, we have
S i0 = ;. Then we check whether f (;)∪ f ({Oφn1}) is classically consistent. If it
is, let S i1 = {Oφn1}, and if it is not, let S i1 = S i0 . After doing this for n times, we
get S in finally. It can be verified that for any i ≤ m, S in is a maximal consistent
set of {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn}. Let ∆ = {S1n , . . . , Smn }. Note that ∆ might not consists
of all maximal consistent sets of {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn}, and it only consists of those
which respect some total extension of <. ∆ is called the preferred remainder set of
{Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn} with respect to <. The entailment relation is defined as follows.
Definition 5.2. {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn} `Oψ if and only if for any S ∈∆, f (S) `PL ψ.
Let `D be the entailment relation of standard deontic logic. It can be proved
that, for any set {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn}, if {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn} is consistent accord-
ing to standard deontic logic, then {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn} ` Oψ if and only if
14Hansen (2006) uses < in a converse sense: Oφi <Oφ j means that Oφi has higher priority than
Oφ j . But if we only consider finite sets of obligations, there is no essential difference.
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{Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn} `D Oψ. The entailment given in this definition is a simplified
version of the one defined in Hansen (2006), where practical inconsistency is also
considered.
This solution for moral conflicts is called the “disjunctive solution”. The name
comes from the following results: Suppose that for some A, the priorities of OA
and O(¬A) are not comparable, i.e., OA 6<O(¬A) and O(¬A) 6<OA, then it can
be verified that {OA,O(¬A)} `O(A∨¬A). This means, in the normative circum-
stance where making A true is not more obligatory than making ¬A true and vice
versa, what the agent really ought to do is to make A∨¬A true. This method can
avoid deontic explosion, that is, {OA,O(¬A)} `OB for any OB , hence provides
Hansen (2006) with an advantage which our theory lacks. Consider the following.
Example 5.3.
(1) It is obligatory that you do physical exercise and drink milk.
(2) It is obligatory that you do physical exercise but do not drink milk.
When the two obligations are not comparable in priorities, it is implied that the
agent ought to do physical exercise and ought to drink milk or not to drink milk.
That is to say, though it is hard for the agent to decide whether she ought to drink
milk or not, it is clear that she still ought to do physical exercise. This result is
fine. In our theory, for any sequence of imperatives, if there is an irresolvable
conflict in that sequence, the agent would get stuck. However, an easy extension
of the current framework is possible to cope with this problem, we leave it to the
readers.
There is a problem with this theory. {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn} ` Oψ means that ψ is re-
ally obligatory in the normative circumstance represented by {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn},
which may contain conflicts15. Suppose that there are some Oφi and Oφ j
in {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn} such that Oφi < Oφ j , Oφi and Oψ j are in conflict but
{Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn}− {Oφi} is consistent. It can be verified that Oφi /∈ Skn for any
Skn ∈ ∆. This means that Oφi is completely conquered by Oφ j . However, the
conflict between Oφi and Oφ j might be caused just by the conflict between
some sub-formula of Oφi and some sub-formula of Oφ j , and dropping Oφi
completely might mean dropping too much. We look at an example:
15What is the intuitive meaning of {Oφ1, . . . ,Oφn} `Oψ is an awkward question. To answer this
question, Horty (2001) distinguishes two kinds of obligations: prima facie and all things considered
ones. We think that this theory is problematic. Hansen (2006) technically avoids to answer this
question. Here we give a vague but still understandable interpretation. In any case, this is an
interesting question.
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Example 5.4.
(1) It is obligatory that you do physical exercise and drink milk.
(2) It is obligatory that you do not drink milk.
We use O(P ∧M ) and O(¬M ) to denote the two sentences respectively. Suppose
that both of the obligations are made to keep the agent’s health but the second
one has higher priority than the first one. In this case, the preferred remainder
∆ of the normative circumstance {O(P ∧ M ),O(¬M )} relative to the priority
order is {{O(¬M )}}. This implies that not drinking milk is really obligatory and
doing physical exercise is not obligatory any more. This result does not seem
reasonable. It seems plausible to think that the agent still ought to do physical
exercise, besides that she ought not to drink milk. Our proposal can deal with
this case better.
Example 5.5. Suppose that two doctors, a and b, utter the following imperatives
to an agent respectively, and b has a higher authority than a.
(1) Doctor a: Do physical exercise and drink milk!
(2) Doctor b: Don’t drink milk!
We use !a(P ∧M ) and !b (¬M ) to respectively express the two imperatives. It can
be verified that !a(P ∧M ), !b (¬M ) |=!b (¬M ) and !a(P ∧M ), !b (¬M ) |=!aP , which
means that the agent should not drink milk, but she still should do physical exer-
cise. This ends our comparison.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have proposed a model of imperative action and multi-agent com-
mands that combines ideas from natural language semantics and logics of agency.
We think that the resulting picture of “force” and “priorities” is more realistic,
both in understanding imperative discourse and commands driven human action.
We have illustrated how the current framework can be applied to interpret many
examples in natural languages. Its background ideas, as well as some further tech-
nical issues have been discussed too. In addition, we have compared our frame-
work with Hansen (2006) in the context of normative conflicts and showed that
though some of our ideas coincide, the proposal presented in this paper can pro-
vide a more realistic and finer solution to normative conflicts.
Next on our agenda are several open questions. Firstly, our discussions have been
mostly semantic-oriented, and we have not explored the idea that whether one
could come up with a complete logic for it and how it looks like. Secondly, we
have represented imperatives as propositions in a track structure in the current
work. We think that alternatively, taking imperatives as a program that leads to
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transitions of states may be more attractive. We plan to adopt dynamic logics in
our future investigations. Thirdly, conflicts come with different kinds or degrees,
due to that imperatives are issued by different authorities. A closer study on the
general features of conflicts is needed here, and we can extend the current frame-
work to deal with more subtle issues there. Finally, given the current framework,
it would be interesting to see its applications. Say, in social settings we can infer
an agent’s authority order by observing how she reacts to orders she has received.
This is similar to what the notion of revealed preference tells us. We will leave
those further studies to other occasions.
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